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I. INTRODUCTION
To many, the use of quotation marks signifies that a writer "is
representing that those are the speaker's own words or something
* The title of this Comment parallels the inherent dilemma of the Masson court's
"rational interpretation" standard. Because of an occasional reference to a particular subject
matter, the title conceivably could be a rational interpretation of this Comment's content.
However, in fairness to the curious reader, the thrust of this Comment centers upon "actual
malice" and the common law rules of defamation as applied to altered quotations.
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very close to them."' According to the United States -Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc.,2 however, a journalist has a first amendment right to "fabricate
quotations,"' 3 and attribute them to a "public figure" 4 if the quota-
tions are a "rational interpretation" of the public figure's authentic
statements. 5
In 1983, Janet Malcolm6 published a two-part article in the New
Yorker magazine regarding psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson and the
conditions surrounding his dismissal from his position as Projects
Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives.7 Masson filed suit in 1984
against Malcolm and the New Yorker magazine in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.' Masson
asserted that the defendants libeled him9 by fabricating quotations
1. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1548 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990); see infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally decided and filed an
opinion in Masson on August 4, 1989. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d
1452 (9th Cir. 1989). On February 15, 1990, the court of appeals denied appellant's motion for
rehearing and rehearing en banc and amended its original opinion. See Masson, 895 F.2d at
1535. On October 1, 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Masson,
111 S. Ct. at 39.
2. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1535 (2-to-I decision).
3. Id. at 1539. For the purpose of the summary judgment standard, the court assumed
that "the quotations were deliberately altered." Id. at 1537.
4. The plaintiff, Masson, acknowledged that he was a "public figure." See Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Brief for Appellant at
11, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-2665)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. A public figure is either an all purpose public figure, by
achieving pervasive fame or notoriety, or a limited purpose public figure, by voluntarily
injecting himself or by being been drawn into the vortex of a public controversy. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). This Comment will not discuss the issue of
fabricated quotations attributed to private individuals.
5. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539; see Taylor, Janet Malcolm's License to Lie, Miami Rev.,
Aug. 16, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
6. Janet Malcolm had an extensive background in psychoanalysis prior to interviewing
Masson. Her father was a psychiatrist. Taylor, Holier Than Thou, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 27, 1989,
at 32-33. Her breakthrough article at the New Yorker was a 1980 profile of an anonymous
psychoanalyst that was later published as a book. See generally J. MALCOLM,
PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE IMPOSSIBLE PROFESSION (1981).
In a 1989 interview with New York Magazine writer John Taylor, Masson recalled his
interviews with Malcolm and suggested that Malcolm had a hidden agenda that led her to
write In the Freud Archives. See Taylor, supra, at 33. He contended that Malcolm had a great
deal invested in psychoanalysis, and that she hoped to discredit him in order to preserve
psychoanalysis from the threat posed by his discoveries. Id.
7. Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives (pts. I & II), NEW YORKER,
Dec. 5, 1983, at 59, Dec. 12, 1983, at 60, reprinted in J. MALCOLM, IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES
(1984).
8. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1396. Masson also filed suit against Knopf, the publisher of
the book. Id.
9. Id. Under California law:
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that made him appear "egotistical, vain, and lacking in personal hon-
esty and moral integrity." 10
Malcolm had tape-recorded, her interviews with Masson."
Therefore, when the challenged quotations in the article did not
appear on her tape transcripts, the district court on summary judg-
ment, and subsequently the court of appeals, accepted as true the alle-
gations that Malcolm altered the quotations and attributed them to
Masson.' 2 Accordingly, this Comment addresses the issue of a jour-
Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy,
or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred,
contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or
which has a tendency to !jure him in his occupation.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
10. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1397.
11. Malcolm had also submitted handwritten and typed notes to support her defense, but
because Masson challenged the accuracy and authenticity of the typed notes, the district court
disregarded those notes in its analysis. Id. at 1398 n.4. Additionally, there was direct evidence
that Malcolm fabricated some of her notes. Certain sentences of her typed drafts had been
crossed out and replaced with the disputed quotations. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1566-67 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39
(1990). Furthermore, Malcolm had repeatedly represented to her publisher that "everything
was on tape" and had told Masson not to worry about being misquoted because all quotations
would be verbatim. Id. at 1567.
12. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
It would not be surprising if Malcolm did in fact alter the quotations given her opinion of
the journalistic profession. In 1989, Malcolm wrote a two-part article describing author Joe
McGinniss' relationship with Jeffrey MacDonald, a doctor and ex-Green Beret who had been
convicted of murdering his wife and two daughters. Malcolm, Reflections: The Journalist and
the Murderer (pts. I & II), NEW YORKER, Mar. 13, 1989, at 38, Mar. 20, 1989, at 49. After
MacDonald's conviction, McGinniss wrote a book, concluding that MacDonald was guilty.
See generally J. McGINNISS, FATAL VISION (1983). MacDonald sued, claiming McGinniss
betrayed his trust; eventually, they reached a $325,000 settlement. See Taylor, supra note 6, at
32.
Malcolm's article portrayed McGinniss as a liar and a fraud who gained MacDonald's
confidence, pretending to believe in his innocence to assure his continued cooperation. See
Malcolm, supra; see also Taylor, supra note 6, at 32. Malcolm, however, not only indicted
McGinniss, but the entire profession as well:
Every journalist who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is
going on knows that what he does is morally indefensible. He is a kind of
confidence man, preying on people's vanity, ignorance, or loneliness, gaining
their trust and betraying them without remorse. Like the credulous widow who
wakes up one day to find the charming young man and all her savings gone, so
the consenting subject of a piece of nonfiction writing learns-when the article or
book appears-his hard lesson.
Malcolm, supra, Mar. 13, 1989, at 38.
Both Masson and McGinniss suggest that Malcolm's article attacking McGinniss is an
attempt to work through her own "seduction and betrayal" of Masson. Taylor, supra note 6,
at 37. McGinniss states:
Before the article came out, someone said to me, 'Don't you see the obvious
transference?' She had betrayed a subject named Jeffrey M. [Masson]. But she
had escaped punishment because of the judge's broad interpretation of the libel
1990]
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nalist's liability for defamation of a misquoted public figure when the
journalist alters a public figure's quotation while having direct
resources to verify the quotation.' 3
Since its 1964 decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,'4 the
United States Supreme Court has subjected defamation law to consti-
tutional scrutiny under the first amendment.' The Court's analysis
weighs the constitutional freedom of the press against the counter-
vailing state interest in protecting the individual's reputation.' 6 The
Court has granted significant constitutional protection to the press
when the individual is a "public official"' 7 or a "public figure,"'"
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statement was
false and to establish "actual malice" on the part of the defendant."
Although common law malice is shown by "ill will, evil or corrupt
motive, intention to injure, hatred, enmity, hostility, or spite,"' 20 the
actual malice standard announced in New York Times requires the
public figure or public official plaintiff to show that the statement was
made "with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."' 21 Later cases define "reck-
less disregard" to require a showing that a false publication was made
with a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity, ' 22 or that
the defendant "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the]
publication. 23
New York Times and its progeny explain that to encourage the
laws. She had unexpiated guilt. Her transference was to project the guilt off
herself and onto me. I was unaware of my role in her psychodrama. She could
expiate guilt toward her Jeffrey M. [Masson] by coming to the aid of another
Jeffrey M. [MacDonald], who was betrayed by a writer [McGinniss]. Freud said
nothing is coincidence.
Id.
13. Journalists who recreate interviews from notes or memory and make inadvertent or
negligent misquotations would remain sufficiently protected from liability. See infra note 236
and accompanying text.
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
16. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
17. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 268 (requiring a showing of "actual malice").
18. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335-37 (extending the New York Times "actual malice" standard to
public figures).
19. See id. at 342; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
20. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976).
21. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. Private figure plaintiffs, however, are not
necessarily held to this higher standard. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
22. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
23. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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dissemination of the truth, it is necessary to protect some misstate-
ments of fact 24 because a rule requiring the press to guarantee the
truth of all factual assertions would result in "self-censorship. ' 25 The
constitutional phrase actual malice, however, is frequently misunder-
stood,26 and raises unique issues when applied to individual situations.
In Masson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
confronted unique issues in applying the actual malice standard to
altered quotations: To what extent is an altered quotation a false
statement of fact within the actual malice framework? And what
level of knowledge, with respect to the altered quotation, is required
to prove, actual malice?
For the analysis of altered quotations of a public figure to neces-
sitate constitutional scrutiny, one first must accept that "[w]hat some-
one says is a fact no less than what someone does."' 27 If a quotation is
a factual assertion, then one must determine whether an altered quo-
tation is a false statement of fact. There are at least two possibilities
in defining falsity: 1) An altered quotation automatically is false
because it purports to be a verbatim quotation when in actuality it is
not, or 2) An altered quotation is false only when the meaning of the
altered quotation is substantially different from the meaning of the
original statement. The first proposition violates the spirit of New.
York Times because it requires journalists to guarantee the truth of all
factual assertions (i.e., the exact wording of the quotation). The New
York Times Court recognized the difficulties of proving truth "in all
24. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-75; see Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment:
The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 490 (1979).
25. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
26. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 n.7
(1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with
bad motive or ill will."); see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971)
(Ill will or bad motives are not elements of the New York Times standard.). Some suggest that
the confusion could be minimized by substituting a less confusing phrase, such as "state of
mind," "deliberate or reckless falsity," or "constitutional limitation." See Westmoreland v.
CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170, 1172 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
27. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1558 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990); see Ben-Oliel v. Press Pub. Co., 251 N.Y. 250,
167 N.E. 432 (1929). In Ben-Oliel, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
In order to constitute libel, it is not necessary for the defendant in its paper
to directly attack the plaintiff as an ignorant imposter. The same result is
accomplished by putting in [the plaintiff's] mouth or attaching to [the plaintiff's
pen] words which make the self-revelation of such a fact. One may say of a
physician that he is an ignorant quack, or he may print a statement by the
physician regarding some operation performed by him or some treatment of a
disease which shows him to the profession to be an ignoramus and a bungler.
Both of these publications would be libelous.
Id. at 255, 167 N.E. at 433-34; see also Taylor, supra note 6, at 35 ("Quotations are facts,
too.").
1990]
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its factual particulars"2 and stated that such a rule would lead to
"self-censorship" and would thereby violate the first amendment.29
The second proposition, however, is in accordance with the
actual malice standard as well as the common law rules of defama-
tion. Under the common law, "[i]t is not necessary to establish the
literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies of
expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true
in substance."30 Consequently, literal truth of a publication is not
necessary; the statement must only be substantially true.3' The test is
"whether the statement produce[s] a different effect upon the reader
than that which would be produced by the literal truth of the mat-
ter."' 32  Under the second proposition, the issue of actual malice
would arise only if the altered quotation is substantially false. If so, it
would be considered a false statement of fact.
Thus, the first issue presented by Masson is whether a court
should look at actual or substantial falsity. An actual falsity inquiry
only would ask whether falsity is established because the quotation
purports to be a verbatim quotation when in actuality it is not. A
substantial falsity3 3 inquiry would ask whether falsity is established
only when the altered quotation produces a different effect upon the
reader than that which would be produced by the verbatim quotation.
If substantial falsity is required, then an actual malice knowledge of
falsity inquiry also must address: 1) Whether the altered quotation
had a different and more damaging effect on the mind of the reader
28. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
29. Id.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f(1977); see W. PROSSER & R.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 842 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that "it is not necessary to prove the
literal truth of the accusation in every detail").
31. See, e.g., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 75 (1988), 109 S. Ct. 1118 (1989); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); Alioto v. Cowles
Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981);
Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232, 504 P.2d 337 (1972); Bell Courier-Journal v. Louisville
Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966); Drury v. Feeney, 505 So. 2d 111 (La. App.), cert.
denied, 506 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1987); Ross v. Columbia Newspapers, Inc., 266 S.C. 75, 221
S.E.2d 770 (1976); Weisburgh v. Mahady, 148 Vt. 70, 511 A.2d 304 (1986).
32. Gomba, 180 Colo. at 234, 504 P.2d at 339; see Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
721 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1983); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn.
107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982); Baia v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 387 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f (1977). This comment
states in pertinent part: "It is not necessary to establish the literal truth of the precise
statement made. Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the
defamatory charge is true in substance." Id.; see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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than the speaker's literal words,34 and 2) Whether the journalist
knew or acted in reckless disregard with respect to the quotation's
different and more damaging effect.35
The standards of both the Masson majority and the dissent, how-
ever, transgress the common law rules of defamation and the New
York Times actual malice standard. The district court had granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment.36 Masson contended that
the fabrication of a quotation attributed to a public figure raised a
genuine issue of fact as to actual malice and therefore precluded sum-
mary judgment.37 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that there is no genuine issue of fact as to
actual malice if the "fabricated quotations are either 'rational inter-
pretations' of ambiguous remarks, '3  or "do not 'alter the substantive
content' of unambiguous remarks actually'made by the public fig-
ure."39 Thus, when a public figure's statements to a journalist differ
from the statements attributed in print, the discrepancy between the
actual statements and those attributed would not necessarily permit a
jury to infer actual malice." The argument on behalf of the Masson
court's standard is one of journalistic discretion: "If the exercise of
literary style were always subject to the threat of a defamation action,
not only would the content of the messages ultimately be altered, but
the vigorous and vital public debate essential to the democratic pro-
cess would be 'tempered to polite sparring.' ""'
The Masson court's rational interpretation standard, however,
34. See Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 193 N.E. 537 (1934); M. ELDRIDGE, LAW
OF DEFAMATION 337 (1978).
35. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring proof of actual
malice); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (same); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (1964) (same); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (same).
36. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1398-99 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Under the standards enunciated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986),
"the appropriate summary judgment question [is] whether the evidence in the record could
support a reasonable jury finding.., that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence." Id. at 255-56.
37. Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 8.
38. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir.) (citing Dunn v.
Gannett New York Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446, 452 (3rd Cir. 1987); and Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 512-13 (1984) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290
(1971))), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 39 (1990).
39. Id. (citing Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied
sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977)).
40. See Reuben, 9th Circuit Rules Close Enough for Media Quotes, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 7,
1989, at 1, col. 4.
41. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 264, 721 P.2d 87, 93, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 206, 212 (1986) (citing Good Government of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
3d 672, 698, 586 P.2d 572, 588, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 273 (1978) (Bird, J., dissenting)).
1990]
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grants unwarraited protection to journalists by disregarding the com-
mon law rules of defamation and constitutional guidelines. Although
the court's "alter the substantive content" standard arguably
addresses the issue of substantial falsity,42 the rational interpretation
standard makes no falsity inquiry Under the rational interpretation
standard, a journalist can take a public figure's statement, interpret
the meaning of that statement, and attribute that interpretation to the
public figure. The main requirement imposed on the journalist is that
the journalist's interpretation is rational. This standard also is in dis-
cord with the United States Supreme Court's admonition in Time,
Inc. v. Firestone,43 that although meaning is unclear, it "does not
license [the journalist] to choose from among several conceivable
interpretations the one most damaging to [the individual].""
The dissent contended that such a standard virtually grants a
license to lie45 so long as the journalist can argue "with a straight face
that it is a rational interpretation of what the speaker said." '46 The
dissent asserted that there was a jury issue of actual malice because
Malcolm either knew that the quotations attributed to Masson were
false or, if she contended that she thought she had faithfully quoted
Masson, she acted in reckless disregard of whether they were false or
not because she could have easily verified the quotations by checking
the tape-recorded passages.47 To resolve the issue, the dissent set
forth a five-step inquiry that analyzes whether a quotation is a verba-
tim representation of what the speaker said.48 If it is not, then the
altered quotation is a fabrication and must be tested under a strict
standard equating fabrication (i.e., a change in wording) with actual
malice.49
The dissent's strict standard is troublesome, however, because it
reduces actual malice to a question of verbatim accuracy rather than
to a question of substantial falsity. 0 The dissent advanced the argu-
ment that "the selective editing of quotations so as to radically alter
42. If an altered quotation does not alter the substantive content of the public figure's
actual statement, then one can argue that the altered quotation is substantially true because the
meaning remains the same.
43. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
44. Id. at 459 & n.4.
45. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1570 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990); see Taylor, supra note 5, at 8, col. 1.
46. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1548.
47. Id. at 1566-68.
48. Id. at 1562-66.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1566.
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their meaning is an anathema among respectable journalists."', Even
so, the United States Supreme Court has stated that an "extreme
departure from professional standards.., cannot provide a sufficient
basis for finding actual malice." 52 Furthermore, to reduce actual mal-
ice to the issue of the accuracy of a quotation (i.e., whether the words
quoted were in fact spoken as attributed) creates an undesirable chil-
ling effect by holding journalists to verbatim quotes. If quotations are
statements of fact requiring constitutional scrutiny, then the issue of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth must also
include whether the altered quotation was substantially false,5"
whether the altered quotation would have a different and more dam-
aging effect on the mind of the reader than the speaker's literal
words,54 and whether the journalist knew or was in reckless disregard
of the different and more damaging effect. 5
This Comment reviews the Masson case and examines the forces
behind the decision. Although the first amendment safeguards the
freedom of the press, 56 the right to alter quotations deliberately and to
attribute defamatory statements is not a concomitant of a free press.57
And while it is not necessary for the press' constitutional autonomy to
allow a journalist to interpret a public figure's statement and then
attribute its own interpretation directly to that public figure,58 a strict
standard regarding fabricated quotations is unwarranted in light of
the likely chilling effect on the press' stylistic discretion. Section II
outlines the first amendment considerations concerning the use of
quotation marks and discusses prior court decisions interpreting these
considerations. Section III reviews the facts of Masson and challenges
the rational interpretation standard in light of common law rules of
defamation, first amendment principles, prior court decisions, and
journalism's canon of ethics. Section IV analyzes the dissent's sug-
gested five-step inquiry, proposes an alternative inquiry, and applies
51. Id. at 1554.
52. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2684 (1989).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f (1977); supra notes 31-33
and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring proof of actual
malice); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (same); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (1964) (same); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (same).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; supra note 15 (text of first amendment).
57. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1548 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
58. But see Reuben, supra note 40, at 1, col. 4. Rex Heinke, a Los Angeles libel lawyer,
asserts that the court's ruling is sensible given the interviewing process. He states:
"Inevitably, there is a fair amount of interpretation that goes on when you interview
someone." Id.
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the alternative inquiry to Masson's facts. Section V concludes that the
court's rational interpretation standard which shields fabricated quo-
tations is a dangerous and unwarranted extension of first amendment
protection, that the adoption of the dissent's five-step inquiry results
in an undesirable chilling effect, and that the alternative inquiry
would result in proper adherence to common law rules of defamation
and the principles of the first amendment.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND QUOTATIONS
A. New York Times and Actual Malice
Modern libel law began in 1964 with the New York Times v. Sul-
livan 5 9 decision in which the United States Supreme Court held that
constitutional guarantees require public officials to prove that a false
and defamatory statement was made with actual malice in order to
recover damages.' At common law, malice is shown by "ill will, evil
or corrupt motive, intention to injure, hatred, enmity, hostility, or
spite."' 61 The actual malice standard announced in New York Times,
however, requires the public official plaintiff to show that a statement
was made "with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 62 Later cases define
"reckless disregard" to require a showing that a false publication was
made with a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity, ' 63 or
that the defendant "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the]
publication. '" 61
The New York Times Court was concerned that a rule requiring
the press effectively to guarantee the truth of all factual assertions
would result in "self-censorship. ' 65 Recognizing that erroneous state-
ments are "inevitable in free debate, ' 66 the Court concluded that erro-
neous statements "must be protected if the freedoms of expression are
to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need... to survive.' "67 Thus,
by invoking the actual malice standard, and thereby eliminating liabil-
59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
60. The Court required that actual malice be demonstrated by convincing clarity. Id. at
285-86. Additionally, the Court required independent appellate review. Id. at 285. For
further discussion of New York Times and the actual malice standard, see Note, The Future of
Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 477 (1986).
61. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976).
62. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
63. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
64. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
65. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
66. Id. at 271.
67. Id. at 271-72 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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ity for the good faith publication of defamatory falsehoods, the Court
identified "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." 68
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,69 confirming the extension of con-
stitutional protection from "public officials" to "public figures," 70 the
Court noted that no idea is false under the first amendment,7" and
that the expression of opinion depends "not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."72 The Court
added, however, that false statements of fact possess no constitutional
value and that neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materi-
ally advance New York Times' interest in "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate on public issues.7 3 Ultimately, false statements
belong to a class of statements which "are no essential part of any
expression of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality."74
B. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby and Summary Judgment
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby," the Court announced the stan-
dard governing summary judgment in libel actions brought by public
figures.76 The Court held that "where the factual dispute concerns
actual malice..., the appropriate summary judgment question will be
68. Id. at 270.
69. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
70. After New York Times, the Court subsequently expanded the doctrine to include
public figures. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see also Gertz, 418
U.S. at 323.
In Butts, Justice Harlan's plurality opinion suggested that, instead of the actual malice
standard, a public figure need only make "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers." Butts, 388 U.S. at 155. But see Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 (1989) (rejecting this approach).
71. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.
72. Id. at 339-40. The Court cites Thomas Jefferson's first Inaugural Address: "If there
be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form, let
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Id. at 340 n.8.
73. Id. at 340 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
74. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
75. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
76. The Court proclaimed:
When determining if a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists in a libel
suit brought by a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind the actual
quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under New York
Times. For example, there is no genuine issue if the evidence presented in the
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury
finding .. that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence ....
The Court's holding defines a "genuine issue" for summary judg-
ment purposes when a plaintiff faces a clear and convincing eviden-
tiary burden of proof.78 Before Anderson, the lower courts were
divided on whether the clear and convincing evidentiary burden per-
tained only to the trial stage or if it pertained to the determination of
whether a plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of fact to survive a
summary judgment motion.79 Anderson applies the burden to sum-
mary judgment so that now, for a plaintiff to establish a genuine issue
in a public figure libel action, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts
such that "a reasonable jury might find that actual malice [has] been
shown with convincing clarity,"8 0 with the trial judge making this
determination.
Some have argued that the Anderson rule extends the role of the
judge, directing the judge to evaluate the persuasive potential of the
evidence presented in support of a summary judgment.8" The deci-
sion, however, appears to be a logical extension of significant proce-
dural protections in first amendment cases.8 2 In Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. ,83 the Court stated:
The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation
case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of
First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier
of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must indepen-
dently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to
cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judg-
ment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of
opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quality to allow a rational finder of
fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view
the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.
Id. at 254.
77. Id. at 255-56.
78. See Comment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.: Federal Rules Decision or First
Amendment Case?, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 933 (1988).
79. Id. (citing Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine
Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 468 (1982)).
80. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
81. See Comment, supra note 78, at 937.
82. But see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 n.7 (acknowledging the Court's "general reluctance
'to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in
addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws'" (quoting Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984))).
83. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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"actual malice."84
C. The Judiciary's Interpretation of Quotations
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Masson reviewed both federal and California cases regarding the issue
of quotations within the guidelines of first amendment protections.
The cases considered fictionalized as well as misleadingly edited
quotations.
1. THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
a. Fictionalized Quotations
i. Carson
Carson v. Allied News Co.8 5 concerned a journalist who wrote an
article describing with abundant detail the supposed struggle between
Johnny Carson and NBC executives concerning the Tonight Show's
move from New York to Hollywood. 86 The article contained "wholly
imagined but supposedly precisely quoted conversations" of Carson
and the NBC executives. 7 In reviewing the unsubstantiated "quoted
conversations," the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit opined:
In the catalogue of responsibilities of journalists, right next to
plagiarism .... must be a canon that a journalist does not invent
quotations and attribute them to actual persons. If a writer can sit
down in the quiet of his cubicle and create conversations as "a logi-
cal extension of what must have gone on" and dispense this as
news, it is difficult to perceive what First Amendment protection
such fiction can claim. In any event, St. Amant expressly gives as
another example of reckless disregard for the truth any "product of
[one's] imagination."88
The court reasoned that by fabricating the quoted conversations, the
defendants necessarily entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
statements and had a high degree of awareness as to their probable
falsity.8 9 Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury's determination as
to the existence of actual malice.90
84. Id. at 511.
85. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
86. Id. at 212.
87. Id. at 212-13.
88. Id. at 213 (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)).
89. Id. at 209 (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
90. Id.
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The Carson opinion clarifies that wholly-imagined fabricated
quotations are not protected under the principles of the first amend-
ment. A journalist who invents quotations and attributes them to
actual persons would meet the requisite actual malice standard
because the journalist knows that the statements are false.
ii. Dunn
In Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc. ,9 the Mayor of
Elizabeth, New Jersey, discussing the city's litter problems, stated:
You have a lot of new people moving into the City of Elizabeth,
some coming from foreign lands where abject poverty was some-
thing they lived with everyday and they have not yet been assimi-
lated into our type of society, and it will take a great deal of time
for some of them to respect the rights and the properties of other
people, and above all, to respect a city that offers them a home in
what I consider to be a wholesome environment.92
In summarizing the Mayor's comments, a Spanish-language newspa-
per printed the following headline: Alcalde de Elizabeth al ataque:
LLAMA 'CERDOS' A LOS HISPANOS. Translated into English,
the headline read: Elizabeth Mayor on the attack: CALLS HISPAN-
ICS 'PIGS.' 93
The Mayor argued that the newspaper, "by enclosing 'cerdos' in
single quotation marks, purported to proclaim that the mayor had in
fact used the word 'pigs' in discussing the litter problem." 94 He
asserted that actual malice could be implied because the defendant
knew the headline was an exaggeration of the truth.95 The district
court granted summary judgment to the newspaper, holding that "the
plaintiff had failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the
newspaper published the headline with actual malice."96
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed, stating that "the headline was a rational interpretation of
remarks that bristled with ambiguities." 97 While some may conclude
that the Dunn decision supports the proposition that actual malice
91. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
92. Id. at 448.
93. Id. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant contested the translations. Id. at 448 n. 1.
94. Id. at 450.
95. Id. at 451.
96. Id. at 449.
97. Id. at 452. The court cited two propositions: (1) that language in an article reflecting
a misconception by an author is not enough to prove actual malice because the language
chosen was "one of a number of possible rational interpretations" of an event "that bristled
with ambiguities," Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
512-13 (1984); and (2) that the "interpretation [of a document], though arguably reflecting a
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cannot be inferred from evidence showing quoted language differs
from actual statements made if the fabricated quotations are rational
interpretations of ambiguous remarks, 9 this conclusion ignores the
rationale behind the Dunn decision.
First, the court acknowledged that the word "cerdos" was an
appropriate and linguistically correct Spanish term for someone who
litters or dirties streets.99 Second, the court recognized that the news-
paper placed quotation marks around the word "cerdos" to signify
that the word was being used figuratively. 100 Finally, the court con-
sidered that the use of quotation marks in Spanish does not necessar-
ily indicate that a literal quotation is intended.' 0
Consequently, the Dunn court never reached the Masson issue of
whether the quoted language differed from actual statements made.
The court concluded that:
[Because the Spanish "cerdos"] was a fair, albeit inadequate, trans-
lation ... of the words "litter," "litterer," or "litterbug," it was
critical to the plaintiff's case that he meet this reality with counter-
vailing factual evidence of actual malice [entertaining serious
doubts as to the truth of the statements or having a high degree of
awareness as to their probable falsity]. This he failed to do. In
failing, he created no genuine issue of material fact."2
Recognizing the inherent difficulties in translating between lan-
guages, the Dunn decision emphasizes that translations involve judg-
ment; a translator must select the foreign-language term that best
corresponds to the English word actually spoken. 103 Even greater dis-
cretion is necessary when no exact translation is possible. 1, The need
for discretion, however, disappears in the context of quoted language
when no translation is necessary. When everyone is speaking English,
no judgment is required, 0 5 and there is no need for rational
interpretation. 106
misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of [actual] 'malice,'" Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971).
98. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
99. Dunn, 833 F.2d at 451.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 452.
103. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1555 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
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iii. Hotchner
In Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, "7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit considered Castillo-Puche's memoir of
his encounters with Ernest Hemingway. The evidence indicated that
Castillo-Puche, in a book published in Spanish, quoted Hemingway as
describing Hotchner, a public figure plaintiff, as follows: "[He is]
dirty and a terrible ass-licker. There's something phony about him. I
wouldn't sleep in the same room with him." 10 8 The publisher, in the
English-language edition of the book "toned down" the quotation,' °9
quoting Hemingway as stating: "I don't really trust him.""'
With regard to the statements in Spanish, the court concluded
that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the publisher
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements or had a
high degree of awareness as to their probable falsity because "[tihe
incident itself is believable and, as all the witnesses at trial agreed, the
language used and sentiments expressed were not uncharacteristic of
Hemingway.""I The editor had contacted Castillo-Puche, who stood
by his account of the incident. The court's rationale is instructive,
concluding that "[w]here a passage is incapable of independent verifi-
cation, and where there are no convincing indicia of unreliability,
publication of the passage cannot constitute reckless disregard for the
truth.1112
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
addressed the "bowdlerized version" of Hemingway's alleged state-
ment, "I don't trust him.""' 3 The court concluded that "[lt [was]
true that in transforming Hemingway's words to the much milder 'I
don't trust him,' . . . [the publisher] was fictionalizing to some extent.
However, the change did not increase the defamatory impact or alter
the substantive content of Hemingway's statement."" 4 Furthermore,
because the publisher could not have been liable for publishing the
uncut version, it could not be liable for deciding to make the passage
less offensive." 15
The Hotchner opinion clearly stands for the proposition that a
plaintiff cannot base a claim on changes in another's quote if the
107. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
108. Id. at 914.
109. Id. at 912.
110. Id. at 914.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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changes do not increase the defamatory impact or alter the substan-
tive content of the quotation. If an altered quotation does not alter
the substantive content of the public figure's actual statement, then it
follows that the altered quotation is substantially true because the
meaning is the same. 16
b. Misleadingly Edited Quotations: Time, Inc. v. Pape
Time, Inc. v. Pape"7 involved a defendant magazine which pub-
lished an article concerning a report of the United States Civil Rights
Commission ("Commission"). The Commission's report enumerated
"the alleged facts in 11 typical cases of police brutality" under the
preface that while "[iun no case has the Commission determined con-
clusively whether [the allegations are correct], . . . [t]he Commission
is of the opinion ... that the allegations appear[ ] substantial enough
to justify discussion." "1 s
The report included the description of an "alleged" racially-
motivated beating of an arrestee by detective Pape.1 9 Drawing upon
the Commission's report, the Time article contained numerous
accounts of police brutality, including a detailed description of the
beating by detective Pape.120 The article, however, omitted the Com-
mission's preface that the report described mere allegations.121 Pape
sued the magazine, charging that actual malice could be inferred from
the omission of the word "alleged" in the Time article. 122 The
Supreme Court refused to infer actual malice from the omission of the
word "alleged" because of the Commission's prefatory remarks about
the "allegations." 123 Instead, the Court held that the preface "may
fairly be characterized as extravagantly ambiguous."' 124 "[I]n context
it was impossible to know whether the Commission was seeking to
encourage belief or skepticism regarding the incidents about to be
described."' 12 Regarding this ambiguity, the Court concluded:
[The magazine's] omission of the word "alleged" amounted to the
adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of
116. Consequently, an altered quotation that does not alter the substantive content has no
more damaging effect than a verbatim quotation and does not increase the defamatory impact
of that verbatim quotation.
117. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
i18. Id. at 287.
119. Id. at 280-81.
120. Id. at 281.
121. Id. at 281-82.
122. See id. at 282.
123. Id. at 288-92.
124. Id. at 287.
125. Id. at 288.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
a document that bristled with ambiguities. The deliberate choice
of such an interpretation, though arguably reflecting a misconcep-
tion, was not enough to create a jury issue of "malice" under New
York Times. To permit the malice issue to go to the jury because
of the omission of a word like "alleged," despite the context of that
word in the Commission Report and the external evidence of the
Report's overall meaning, would be to impose a much stricter stan-
dard of liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on the
errors of historic fact. 126
The Pape opinion acknowledges that publishers who maintain a
standard of care, such as "to avoid knowing falsehood or reckless dis-
regard of the truth," are protected from good faith errors by the first
amendment.' 27 The Court recognized that press reports about news
events can contain "an almost infinite variety of shadings."' 28 In
materials such as the Commission report, where "the source itself has
engaged in qualifying the information released, complexities ram-
ify.' ' 29 Thus, "[a]ny departure from full direct quotation of the words
of the source, with all its qualifying language, inevitably confronts the
publisher with a set of choices. "130
The ambiguities in the preface of the Commission report entitled
the magazine to adopt one of a number of possible rational interpreta-
tions of the document. The omission of the word "alleged" was a
matter of interpretation or judgment, necessarily protected by the first
amendment. Conversely, in the context of unqualified quotations
attributed to a third party, such standards cannot apply.' 3 ' When
quoting a third party, there is little need for interpretation. Quotation
marks signify that the journalist "is representing that those are the
speaker's own words or something very close to them"'' 32 and that the
journalist warrants that no editorial comment has been interposed, no
ambiguities have been resolved, and nothing of substance has been
added or detracted. 33
126. Id. at 290.
127. Id. at 291.
128. Id. at 286.
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. But see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 & 1544-45 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
132. Id. at 1548 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1549.
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2. THE CALIFORNIA COURTS
a. Bindrim
Bindrim v. Mitchell 34 concerned a defendant author who wrote
a purported novel about a fictional psychiatrist who demanded in
obscene and unprofessional language that a patient "drag" his wife to
a "nude marathon."' 35  The plaintiff, a public figure psychologist,
sued for libel, claiming that he was the psychiatrist portrayed in the
novel and that the defendant fictionalized the defamatory quotations
and attributed them to him. 36 At trial, the evidence revealed that the
defendant author attended the psychologist's "nude marathon" ses-
sions, that she told the psychologist that she was attending for thera-
peutic purposes and had no intention of writing about a "nude
marathon," and that she signed a written contract to that effect. 137
The psychologist produced a tape recording of a therapy session that
the author had attended. The tape revealed that the psychologist
merely suggested in a decent and understanding manner that the
patient bring his wife to a "nude marathon."' 138
The jury concluded that the book was not fiction, that the quota-
tions attributed to the psychologist were false and defamatory, and
that the defendant published the quotations with actual malice.' 39
The defendant appealed, claiming that clear and convincing evidence
did not support the jury's finding of actual malice.1 " The California
Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's findings, holding that:
[The defendant author's] reckless disregard for the truth was
apparent from her knowledge of the truth of what transpired at the
encounter, and the literary portrayals of that encounter. Since she
attended sessions, there can be no suggestion that she did not know
the true facts. Since "actual malice" concentrates solely on defend-
134. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979),
disapproved on other grounds, McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 727 P.2d 711, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 518 (1986).
135. Id. at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The fictional psychiatrist told his patient to "drag his
wife [to a "nude marathon"] ... by the fucking cunt." Id. The term "nude marathon" is
described as a form of group therapy used as a means of helping people to shed their
psychological inhibitions with the removal of their clothes. Id. at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
136. Id. at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
137. Id. The contract read as follows:
The participant agrees that he will not take photographs, write articles, or in any
manner disclose who has attended the workshop or what has transpired. If he
fails to do so he releases all parties from this contract, but remains legally liable
for damages sustained by the leaders and participants.
Id.
138. Id. at 70-71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
139. Id. at 71-75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35-37.
140. Id. at 71-72, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
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ants' attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material published,
and not on malicious motives, certainly defendant . . was in a
position to know the truth or falsity of her own material, and the
jury was entitled to find that her publication was in reckless disre-
gard of that truth or with actual knowledge of falsity.1 4'
The Bindrim court's approach regarding quotations is significant.
The author had attended the "nude marathon" sessions and therefore
had direct knowledge of the psychologist's statements. Since she
knew the true facts, there was no ambiguity as to what was said, and
there was nothing to interpret. The fabricated quotations were sub-
stantially false and had a different and more damaging effect on the
mind of the reader than the psychologist's actual statements. 1 42 Thus,
as in similar situations (i.e., when a journalist tape-records an inter-
view), actual malice potentially exists because the author is in a posi-
tion to know of the truth or falsity of her own material and to know of
the departure from the substantial truth. The author's altering the
meaning of the actual statements entitles the defamed to a jury's
determination of actual malice.' 43
b. Selleck
Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. 1 involved a defendant maga-
zine that falsely attributed statements about Tom Selleck's love life to
the actor's father. Selleck's father alleged that he never gave an inter-
view to any of the defendant's reporters nor consented to any inter-
view that could be used by or sold to the defendant.' 45
The California Court of Appeals concluded that because the
magazine article "attributed to plaintiff statements he did not make,"
the magazine acted with actual malice by publishing the statements
"with knowledge that they were falsely attributed to plaintiff or with a
reckless disregard of the fact that plaintiff did not make the state-
ments."' 46 The court, considering the argument that the quoted
141. Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36 (citations omitted).
142. The court stated:
It is clear from the transcript of the actual encounter weekend proceeding that
some of the incidents portrayed by Mitchell are false: i.e., substantially
inaccurate descriptions of what actually happened. It is also clear that some of
these portrayals cast plaintiff in a disparaging light since they portray his
language and conduct as crude, aggressive, and unprofessional.
Id. at 77, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
143. Id. at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35.
144. 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1985).
145. Id. at 1128, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
146. Id. at 1129, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 841. But see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895
F.2d 1535, 1538 n.1 (9th Cir.) (arguing that Selleck never discussed actual malice), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
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passages merely were an expression of opinion and therefore did not
give rise to a cause of action, concluded: "[The article did] not merely
express the defendant's opinion that plaintiff made statements about
his son. Rather, [it] assert[ed] as a fact that plaintiff made the state-
ments." 1 47 Once again, the California Court of Appeals offers an
instructive opinion regarding quotations. If the article gives a clear
impression that the subject has made the statements, such as a
reporter's use of direct quotations from a personal interview, the com-
plete fabrication of these statements necessarily constitutes actionable
actual malice.
c. Baker
Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner"'4 addresses the distinc-
tion between expressions of opinion and statements of fact. In Baker,
the defendant newspaper published a television critic's review of a
documentary on sexual education produced by the plaintiff.4 9 The
critic's review of the documentary contained the following statement:
"My impression is that the executive producer Walt Baker, who is
also vice president in charge of programs for Channel 9, told his
writer/producer, Phil Reeder, 'We've got a hot potato here-let's
pour on titillating innuendo and as much bare flesh as we can get
away with. Viewers will eat it up!' "
The California Supreme Court held that the quotation was not a
statement of fact and therefore was not actionable.' The critic had
notified the reader that he was only giving his "impression." By using
the term "impression," the critic had informed the reader that he was
only expressing an opinion.' 52 Consequently, Baker offers an illustra-
tion of how a journalist can defeat the inference that quoted material
purports to be exactly what the speaker said. Nevertheless, a problem
still exists when a journalist uses quotation marks to indicate a verba-
tim quotation.
III. MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZIN, INc: THE CASE
A. The Dispute
In 1983, Janet Malcolm interviewed psychoanalyst Jeffrey Mas-
147. Selleck, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1133, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
148. 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032
(1987).
149. Id. at 256, 721 P.2d at 87-88, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
150. Id. at 258, 721 P.2d at 89, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
151. Id. at 269, 721 P.2d at 96, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
152. Id. at 263, 721 P.2d at 92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
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son. She later published a two-part article in the New Yorker maga-
zine regarding Masson and the conditions surrounding his dismissal
as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives. 153 As Projects
Director, Masson discovered material relating to Freud's abandon-
ment of the "seduction theory."1 54 Freud's theory posited that certain
mental illnesses originated in sexual abuse in childhood and that chil-
dren were molested more frequently than had been supposed.155 Mas-
son asserted that the psychoanalytical establishment suppressed his
findings. 156 In discussing with Malcolm the ensuing struggle with the
Archives' board members,'57 Masson claimed that the board termi-
nated his contract because he went public with his view that Freud
abandoned the "seduction theory" in order to further his own career
and to appease his colleagues. 5 ' In Malcolm's article, she attributed
several alleged quotations to Masson. 59
Masson filed suit in 1984 against Malcolm and the New Yorker
magazine. 16° Masson asserted that the defendants libeled him 16 1 by
fabricating quotations that made him appear "egotistical, vain, and
lacking in personal honesty and moral integrity."' 162  Malcolm had
tape-recorded her interviews with Masson. 163 Therefore, when the
challenged quotations in the article did not appear on her tape tran-
scripts, the district court, on summary judgment, and subsequently
the court of appeals, accepted the allegations that Malcolm altered the
quotations and attributed them to Masson.16 The following passages
are examples of the challenged quotations.
165
153. Malcolm, supra note 7.
154. See J. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE
SEDUCTION THEORY xv-xxiii (1984).
155. See id.; see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, I I I S. Ct. 39 (1990); Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 4.
156. Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 4.
157. For a brief overview of the uproar surrounding Masson and his theory, see L. FORER,
A CHILLING EFFECT 221-22 (1987); J. MALCOLM, supra note 7.
158. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1536.
159. For examples of the alleged quotations, see text accompanying infra notes 166-88.
160. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Masson also filed suit against Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., the publisher of Malcolm's book.
161. Id.; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982); see also supra note 9 (California's definition
of libel).
162. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1397.
163. See supra note 11.
164. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1548 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 39 (1990); Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1407.
165. For the sake of brevity, this Section will include only a few of the challenged
quotations. For a complete account of all challenged quotations, see Masson, 895 F.2d at
1539-46; Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 14-45; Appellees' and Cross-Appellants' Brief at
18-45, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-2665).
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1. THE FICTIONALIZED QUOTATIONS
a. "I Was Like an Intellectual Gigolo"
Malcolm wrote about a confession Masson gave regarding an
affair he had with a graduate student while he was in college. Essen-
tially, the woman had told Masson that outside of the bedroom he
was a social embarrassment. Malcolm then attributed to Masson a
statement comparing his affair to his relationship with members of the
psychoanalitical establishment: that he was "an intellectual gigolo."
Malcolm wrote:
Then I met a rather attractive older graduate student, and I had an
affair with her. One day, she took me to some art event, and she
was sorry afterward. She said, "Well, it is very nice sleeping with
you in your room, but you're the kind of person who should never
leave the room-you're just a social embarrassment anywhere else,
though you do fine in your own room." And, you know, in their
way, if not in so many words, Eissler and Anna Freud told me the
same thing. They liked me well enough "in my own room." They
loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts analysts are. I was like
an intellectual gigolo--you get your pleasure from him, but you
don't take him out in public. 166
The italicized portion of the quotation did not appear in Mal-
colm's tape recordings.' 67 The district court, however, noted that the
tape of this conversation contained the following passage:
[Eissler and Anna Freud] felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a
public liability. They like me when I was alone in their living
room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the truth about
things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a sense, much too
junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training
analysts to be caught dead with me.'16
Concluding that "[t]he descriptive term 'intellectual gigolo,' as used
in this context, simply means that Masson's views were privately
entertaining, but publicly embarrassing to Freud and Eissler," the dis-
trict court held that Malcolm's use of the "descriptive" term "intel-
lectual gigolo" was a "rational interpretation of Masson's
166. Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 29-30; see also Masson, 895 F.2d at 1540-41.
167. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1540. It did appear, however, in Malcolm's interview notes.
Nevertheless, the district court assumed for the purpose of disposing of the summary judgment
motion that Masson did not refer to himself as an intellectual gigolo. Id.
168. Id. Other portions of the taped interviews demonstrated that Masson boasted about
his ability to charm senior analysts. He told Malcolm, for example, that "I had managed to
worm my way into the good graces of Eissler and Anna Freud... through charm and this had
worked.on them, and they had like fallen into a spell. I had mesmerized them." Id. at 1540
n.4.
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comments." 69
b. "Sex, Women, Fun"
Malcolm's article also quoted Masson as saying that if he had
moved into Freud's house in London, the house would not only have
been "a place of scholarship, but it would also have been a place of
sex, women, fun."' 7 ° This statement did not appear on Malcolm's
tape recordings. The district court granted summary judgment to
Malcolm finding the "disputed passage ... substantially true because
the sting of the passage is the same as that of undisputed tape-
recorded passages."'' In the taped interview, Masson stated
"[t]hey're going to be calling the police on me every, every time I give
a party or something," and that "I could have had some fun."'17 2
Masson commented that he envisioned the Freud house as a site for
wild parties. 73 Masson also boasted of his sexual prowess, stating
that before he became an analyst he had slept with over 1,000
women. 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the "sex, women, fun" quotation was "consistent with
169. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1400-01 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
The district court's holding begs the question of why a journalist needs to describe exactly
what someone said and then represent that description as a direct quotation.
In reviewing the "I was an intellectual gigolo" quotation, the Masson court, although
acknowledging that Masson never made that statement, nevertheless adopted the district
court's conclusion. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1541. The Masson court concluded that Malcolm's
interpretation did not alter the substantive content of Masson's description of himself as a
"private asset but a public liability." Id.
In holding as a matter of law that a reasonable jury would find that the statement "I was
an intellectual gigolo" does not alter the substantive content of the statement "I was a 'private
asset but a public liability,'" the Masson court exposes an underlying tension within the
Masson case. Malcolm herself had confessed that the term "gigolo" denoted a form of
prostitution and "selling your sexual favors," and that she intended to represent this to the
readers. Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 32. The district court, however, ignored her
admission and concluded that the term "simply means that Masson's views were privately
entertaining, but publicly embarrassing to Freud and Eissler." Masson, 895 F.2d at 1541. The
district court's conclusion, however, is invalid under MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52
Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959), which held that although an innocent meaning can be derived
from a statement, the court may not treat it as non-defamatory where a reasonable
interpretation could also be defamatory. Id. at 547-48, 343 P.2d at 42. In addition to
Malcolm's own admission of defamatory intent, the dissent read the "intellectual gigolo"
quotation as defamatory: "For an academic to refer to himself as an intellectual gigolo is such
a devastating admission of professional dishonesty that a jury could well conclude that it is
libelous." Masson, 895 F.2d at 1551 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Masson court
read the altered quotation as non-defamatory.
170. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542; Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1404.
171. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1404-05.
172. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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Masson's description of his lifestyle and conception of 'fun' " and
therefore did not establish malice by clear and convincing evidence. 75
c. "Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived"
The district court found that the following passage in Malcolm's
article was the "most problematic":1
76
A few days after my return to New York, Masson, in a state of
elation, telephoned me to say that Farrar, Straus & Giroux had
taken The Assault on Truth. "Wait till it reaches the best-seller
list, and watch how the analysts will crawl. They move whichever
way the wind blows. They will want me back, they will say that
Masson is a great scholar, a major analyst-after Freud, he's the
greatest analyst who ever lived. Suddenly they'll be calling, beg-
ging, cajoling: 'Please take back what you've said about our profes-
sion; our patients are quitting.' They'll try a short smear
campaign, then they'll try to buy me, and ultimately they'll have to
shut up. Judgment will be passed by history. There is no possible
refutation of this book. It's going to cause a revolution in psychoa-
nalysis. Analysis stands or falls with me now."'
1 7 7
Masson claimed the conversation never took place and alleged that
the "'sting' of the passage is that it portrays Masson as a grandiose
egotist and full of braggadocio."'
171
The district court noted that many tape recorded passages con-
tained similar egotistical statements: "for better or for worse, analysis
stands or falls with me now"; "it's me and Freud against the rest of
the analytic world .... Not so, it's me. It's me alone"; and "[I] could
single-handedly bring down the whole business [of Freudian psychol-
ogy].' 179 Although Masson explicitly stated that it was his discover-
ies regarding the material that the psychoanalytic establishment
suppressed and not his ability as an analyst that would shake the ana-
lytic world,8 0 the district court nonetheless concluded that "[iln light
of the many egotistical and boastful statements that Masson made in
tape-recorded comments ... [Masson] has not demonstrated clear
and convincing evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that Malcolm entertained serious doubts about the accuracy of the
passage."'' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
175. Id.
176. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1405.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1405-06; see Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542.
180. When told that his statements were grandiose, Masson replied "it's got nothing to do
with me. It's got to do with the things I discovered." Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1405.
181. Id. at 1406.
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cuit agreed, holding that "the purportedly fictionalized quotation
actually reflects the substance of Masson's self-appraisal."'1
8 2
2. THE MISLEADINGLY EDITED QUOTATIONS
18 3
In the article, Malcolm quoted Masson as stating:
[Eissler] was always putting moral pressure on me [to keep silent
about my discoveries about Freud]. "Do you want to poison Anna
Freud's last days? Have you no heart? You're going to kill the
poor old woman." I said to him, "What have I done? You're
doing it. You're firing me. What am I supposed to do, be grateful
to you?" "You could be silent about it. You could swallow it. I
know it is painful for you. But you could just live with it in
silence." "Why should I do that?" "Because it is the honorable
thing to do." Well, he had the wrong man.18 4
Masson's unedited remarks on tape were as follows:
[Eissler] was constantly putting various kinds of moral pressure on
me, and, "Do you want to poison Anna Freud's last days" "Have
you no heart?" He called me up, "Have you no heart? Think of
what she's done for you and you are now willing to do this to her."
I said, "What am I, What have I done? You're doing it, you're
firing me. What am I supposed to do, thank you? Be grateful to
you?" He said, "Well you could never talk about it, you could be
silent about it, you could swallow it. I know it's painful to you, but
just live with it in silence." "Fuck you," I said, "Why should I do
that Why? You know, why should one do that?" "Because it's the
honorable thing to do, and you will save face, and who knows, ifyou
never speak about it and quietly and humbly accept our judgment,
who knows in a few years if we don't bring you back?" Well, he had
the wrong man.' 8
5
Masson asserted that Malcolm deleted the emphasized portion
above to make it appear that he was "the wrong man" to ask to do
something honorable when, in fact, the unedited passage discloses
that he "was the wrong man" to ask to remain silent in the hope of
regaining his position.' 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit declared that Masson's "he was the wrong man" state-
ment was ambiguous."8 7 The court proclaimed that because it was
unclear whether Masson meant he was the "wrong man" to ask to do
182. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542.
183. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit discussed two
challenged quotations, for brevity's sake this Section will only discuss one. See id. at 1545-46.
184. Id. at 1546.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Id.; Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1400.
187. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1546.
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something honorable or the "wrong man" to ask to remain silent in
the hope of regaining his position, Malcolm was warranted to edit
Masson's statement and that the edited statement attributed to Mas-
son was a rational interpretation of Masson's ambiguous remarks. 8'
B. Journalism's Canon of Ethics
The dissent asserted that although the practice of correcting quo-
tations to avoid grammatical errors and improper word usage is
widely accepted within the journalistic profession, 8 9 "the selective
editing of quotations so as to radically alter their meaning is an anath-
ema among respectable jouralists.' 19  Citing several leading author-
ities who are consistent in condemning selective editing, 9' the dissent
stated:
No reporter has the right to manipulate the words of others so as
to convey impressions that are distortions of the spirit of those
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1558 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting from THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL 184 (1982)).
190. Id. at 1554.
191. See id. at 1558 ("[q]uotation marks mean literally that the words they enclose are
exactly as the source gave them-verbatim," quoting M.V. CHARNLEY & B. CHARNLEY,
REPORTING 238 (4th ed. 1979)); id. (direct quotations are used "[tlo surround the exact words
of a speaker or writer reported in a story," citing THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND
LIBEL MANUAL 183 (1982)); id. ("[m]ost of the newspaper codes or canons tend to stress
literal accuracy when quoting news sources," quoting J.L. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S
MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1976)); see also J.L. HULTENG,
PLAYING IT STRAIGHT: A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS 64 (1981) (stating that "[i]t is never justifiable
for a journalist to make up quotations, however plausible or characteristic, or to edit a source's
comments so that their thrust or meaning is altered any way").
A school of thought known as New Journalism proposes that journalists have the right to
vary or rearrange the facts of a story in order to advance a literary purpose. Masson, 895 F.2d
at 1559. Tom Goldstein describes New Journalism as follows:
In an advertisement, Harper's Magazine tried defining New Journalism
metaphorically as "somewhere west of journalism and this side of history," the
"place where reporting becomes literature." In this unchartered territory,
writers embellished quotes, burrowed into characters' interior thoughts, created
scenes that may have happened but did not, and made up characters who were
collages of real people.
Id. at 1559 n.13 (quoting T. GOLDSTEIN, THE NEWS AT ANY COST: HOW JOURNALISTS
COMPROMISE THEIR ETHICS TO SHAPE TIHE NEWS 211 (1985)).
In 1980, John Hersey attacked New Journalism on the following premise:
I will assert that there is one sacred rule of journalism. The writer must not
invent. The legend on the license must read: NONE OF THIS WAS MADE UP.
The ethics of journalism, if we can be allowed such a boon, must be based on the
truth that every journalist knows the difference between the distortion that comes
from subtracting observed data and the distortion that comes from adding
invented data.
Id. at 1559 n. 14 (quoting Hersey, The Legend of the License, YALE REV. 1, 2 (Autumn 1980).
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words. You may misplace a comma or substitute one adjective for
another and still not alter the thrust of a quote or paraphrase. But
you have no license to violate the source's intent by changing the
meaning of what he said, no matter what the motivation or
temptation.
•.. The manipulation--or fabrication-of a quote in order to
condition the reader's perception of a news figure or a news situa-
tion is a breach of journalistic ethics....
Absolute, literal accuracy can rarely be achieved, as we have
noted earlier, but it is a firmly-rooted journalistic convention that
the central meaning, the spirit, of a speaker's words must be truly
conveyed. 192
The dissent noted that the New Yorker itself professes the identi-
cal belief. 193 According to William Shawn, editor-in-chief when Mal-
colm's article was published, "the New Yorker 'ideal is a verbatim
quote[;] ... the most important thing is not to violate the truth.., of
what somebody has said.' "194 Although the Court in Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton 19' declared that a departure
from the standards and ambitions of the profession cannot alone pro-
vide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice,1 96 the Masson dissent
argued that it is difficult to interpret the first amendment as granting
journalists a privilege to employ standards that they themselves
disown. 197
C. The Majority Opinion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
bound to apply California libel law in Masson.19s Under California
libel law, 199 the statements Malcolm attributed to Masson could con-
stitute libel if they exposed Masson to "hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy, or... cause[d] him to be shunned or avoided, or... ha[d] a
tendency to injure him in his occupation." 200 There is little doubt
that the four quotations, "I was an intellectual gigolo," "sex, women,
192. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1559 (quoting J.L. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES:
ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS MEDIA 71 (1976)).
193. Id. at 1561.
194. Lipman, At the New Yorker, Editor and a Writer Differ on the 'Facts,' Wall St. J., June
18, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
195. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
196. Id. at 2684.
197. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
198. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law).
199. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982); see supra note 9 (California's definition of libel).
200. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
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fun," "greatest analyst who ever lived," and "he had the wrong man,"
would constitute libel under California standards. For example, a
critical review of Malcolm's article yielded the following comments:
Masson the promising psychoanalytic scholar emerges gradually,
as a grandiose egotist-mean-spirited, self-serving, full of bragga-
docio, impossibly arrogant and, in the end, a self-destructive fool.
But it is not Janet Malcolm who calls him such: his own words
reveal this psychological profile-a self-portrait offered to us
through the efforts of an observer and listener who is, surely, as
wise as any in the psychoanalytic profession.20 1
Another review added that "Malcolm's portrait of Masson is devas-
tating: largely through his own words he emerges as a feverish jumble
of vanity, self-destruction, childishness, and ruthlessness. '"202 These
reviews demonstrate that Malcolm's altered quotations exposed Mas-
son to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy, and tended to injure
him in his occupation. Additionally, they indicate that readers give
greater weight to a direct quotation of one's remarks than to a writer's
descriptive statements because the direct quotation permits readers to
draw their own conclusions about the speaker's character, motive,
candor, and lucidity.20 3
Despite the impact of the defamatory statements, the Masson
court revisited the Dunn, Hotchner, and Pape opinions2°4 and crafted
its own standard for altered quotations that permitted Malcolm to
attribute the defamatory statements to Masson with impunity. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held:
Malice will not be inferred from evidence showing that the quoted
language does not contain the exact words used by the plaintiffs
provided that the fabricated quotations are either "rational inter-
pretations" of ambiguous remarks made by the public figure, or do
not "alter the substantive content" of unambiguous remarks actu-
ally made by the public figure.20 5
Although the alter the substantive content standard arguably con-
cerns the issue of substantial truth,2° the Masson court's rational
201. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Coles, Freudianism and Its Malcontents, Boston Globe, May 27, 1984, at
58, 60 (emphasis added)), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
202. Id. (quoting KIRKUS REV., Apr. 1, 1984, at 345 (emphasis added)).
203. See id. & n.2.
204. See supra notes 91-133 and accompanying text.
205. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539 (citations omitted).
206. If an altered quotation does not alter the substantive content of the public figure's
actual statement, then one can argue that the altered quotation is substantially true because the
meaning is the same.
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interpretation standard bypasses actual malice and grants an unwar-
ranted constitutional protection to journalists who alter quotations.
There is a problem with the Masson standard. Under the
rational interpretation standard, a journalist can take a public figure's
statement, interpret the meaning of that statement, and attribute that
interpretation to the public figure. The Masson court's approach is
indifferent to the public figure's actual meaning, asking only whether
the journalist's interpretation is rational. The danger of such a stan-
dard is obvious: if journalists are given the license to invent quota-
tions based on interpretations of ambiguities or content, there are no
words that a journalist could not put into a subject's mouth.2 °7
There is a fundamental difference between remaining faithful to
"the central meaning ... [and] the spirit of the speaker's words,"
which would permit correcting quotations to avoid grammatical
errors and improper word usage,20 8 and altering quotations to corre-
spond to the journalist's interpretation of what the speaker said.2°
Under a central meaning standard, if the words spoken are ambigu-
ous, the journalist cannot alter them to remove the ambiguity because
that would change the spirit of what the speaker said.21° Under the
Masson court's rational interpretation standard, the journalist is given
precisely that privilege.211 Instead of granting journalists the privilege
of rational interpretation, a constitutionally consistent approach
should ask whether the jury could find substantial falsity with respect
to the altered quotation (i.e., that the altered quotation is not substan-
tially true and that it has a different and more damaging effect on the
reader than the actual statements) and whether the jury could find
actual malice as to the substantial falsity.21 2 This would permit jour-
nalists to alter the language within the quotation but would still
require them to remain faithful to the meaning of the speaker's
authentic statements.
The Masson court's conclusion that the "sex, women, fun" quo-
tation was "consistent with Masson's description of his lifestyle and
conception of 'fun' "213 illustrates the dangers of the Masson standard.
Because Masson, in unrelated conversations, had commented that he
envisioned the Freud house as a site for wild parties, had boasted of
his sexual prowess, and had mentioned that he had slept with over
207. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1553 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
208. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
209. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1559 n.12 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
210. See supra text accompanying note 208.
211. See id.
212. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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1,000 women before becoming an analyst, the Masson court granted
Malcolm the license to describe her impression and perception of
Masson's lifestyle purportedly in his own words.
Under Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner,214 Malcolm is
protected by the first amendment to give her impressions and percep-
tions of Masson if she characterizes them as such. Under the Masson
standard, however, Malcolm was given much more. The standard
allowed her to perceive Masson's character and to invent quotations
based on those perceptions. The dissent's outrage over this result is
justified:
The court's reliance on this remote and inapposite remark
[that Masson had slept with over 1,000 women before he became
an analyst], made by Masson during the course of an entirely unre-
lated conversation, demonstrates just how far afield a journalist
may roam under the "rational interpretation" approach. To be
sure, if one digs through the over one thousand pages of interview
transcript, one occasionally finds the word sex; specifically, Masson
did discuss his exploits as a young man, albeit with some remorse.
But what does that prove? In effect, the court is saying that,
because of his wayward youth, Masson is the kind of guy who
probably would use the Freud house for "sex, women, fun," and
therefore Malcolm was entitled to say so to the world.215
The Masson court concluded that the "sex, women, fun" quota-
tion did not establish actual malice by clear and convincing evi-
dence.21 6 Implicit in this conclusion is the court's misconception of
actual malice and the common law rules of defamation. There was no
actual malice inquiry as to knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth. The Court merely asked whether the altered quotation
was a rational interpretation of Masson's actual remarks. Under the
appropriate common law rules of defamation and an actual malice
inquiry, the court should have asked whether the "sex, women, fun"
quotation was substantially false and if so, whether a jury could find
that Malcolm knew or acted in reckless disregard that the quotation
had been altered and that the altered quotation would have a different
and more damaging effect on the reader than the verbatim
quotation.21 7
The court's treatment of the "greatest analyst who ever lived"
quotation further illustrates the Masson court's misconception. The
214. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
215. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1553 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
216. Id. at 1542.
217. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
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quotation did not appear on the tape transcripts., Masson never
asserted that people would say "after Freud, he's the greatest analyst
who ever lived." Masson proffered evidence that the passage por-
trayed him as "a grandiose egotist and full of braggadocio."2 8
Despite Masson's explicit taped statement that his discoveries of
material suppressed by the psychoanalytic establishment would shake
the analytic world, Malcolm altered Masson's words to imply that
Masson meant his abilities as an analyst would do so.2 19 Again, the
Masson court's standard allowed Malcolm to perceive Masson's char-
acter and to invent quotations based on those perceptions solely
because Masson had made other unrelated egotistical and boastful
statements. In other words, under the Masson court's standard, if one
makes statements that reasonably can be construed as egotistical or
boastful (or any other trait of character or intellect), the journalist can
attribute any other statements reflecting that same trait in an unre-
lated matter and remain protected by the first amendment.22
The flaw in the court's standard is that it does not employ the
proper test of substantial truth. To establish substantial truth, "[iut is
not necessary to establish the literal truth of the precise statement
made. Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that
the defamatory charge is true in substance."22' It is not enough, how-
ever, that the defamed person "is found to have engaged in some
other substantially different kind of misconduct even though it is
equally or more reprehensible." '222 "Specific charges cannot be justi-
fied by showing the plaintiff's general bad character. ' 223 "[I]f the
accusation is one of particular misconduct, . . . it is not enough to
show a different offense, even though it be a more serious one." '224 In
Masson, the specific charge is that Masson said that after Freud, he
was the greatest analyst who ever lived. This specific charge cannot
be dismissed as being substantially true solely because Masson made
unrelated egotistical and boastful statements. Under the Masson
court's rational interpretation standard, however, the court avoids
this issue.
The misleadingly edited quotation, "he had the wrong man, '"225
218. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
220. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1550 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f (1977); see W. PROSSER & R.
KEETON, supra note 30, at 842 (stating that "it is not necessary to prove the literal truth of the
accusation in every detail"); supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f (1977).
223. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 30, at 841.
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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reveals the inherent problems in applying the rational interpretation
standard to quotations. The Masson court noted that the statement
"he had the wrong man" was ambiguous as to whether Masson meant
he was the "wrong man" to ask to do something honorable or to ask
to remain silent in hopes of regaining his position. 226 The court con-
cluded that "[t]he statement Malcolm ascribed to Masson was a
rational interpretation of his ambiguous remarks." '2 2 7 The court
relied on Time, Inc. v. Pape 228 to support its proposition. The issue in
Pape concerned an article's interpretation of a government document
filled with "extravagantly ambiguous" language and-the omission of
the single word "alleged. ' 229 The Court concluded:
To permit the malice issue to go to the jury because of the omission
of a word like "alleged," despite the context of that word in the
Commission Report and the external evidence of the Report's
overall meaning, would be to impose a much stricter standard of
liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on errors of
historic fact.230
Masson, however, did not concern the interpretation of a report;
it concerned quotations where words spoken were not ambiguous.
The rational interpretation standard permitted Malcolm to attribute
her interpretation of Masson's statement directly to Masson without
questioning its different and more damaging effect on the reader. The
court should have decided whether the edited quotation was substan-
tially false, and whether Malcolm knew or acted in reckless disregard
that the altered quotation would have a different and more damaging
effect on the reader than the verbatim quotation.
When quoting a third party, a journalist strongly implies that
"this is a statement of fact, this is what the subject said," not that "the
subject's statement was ambiguous and this is what I perceive him to
be saying." While a journalist is entitled under the first amendment
to communicate those perceptions, the journalist must alert the reader
that they are perceptions, not statements of fact. The journalist may
also alter quotations as long as the journalist is faithful to the
speaker's original meaning. Allowing journalists to report rational
interpretations of ambiguous remarks as accurate quotations permits
journalists to make potentially devastating statements of purported
226. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1546 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, IIl S. Ct. 39 (1990).
227. Id.
228. 401 U.S. 279 (1971); see supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
229. Pape, 401 U.S. at 287.
230. Id. at 290.
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fact with impunity.2 3' The rational interpretation standard grants
unwarranted constitutional protection and is inappropriate.
IV. MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE INc: THE DISSENT
A. The Dissent's Inquiry
The Masson dissent recognized the dangers of the majority's
standard, arguing that the holding gives a journalist the license to
lie232 if the journalist can "argue with a straight face that it is a
rational interpretation of what the speaker said. ' 233 The dissent
asserted that when balanced against the Court's concerns in New York
Times, the majority's standard is unjustified and that requiring jour-
nalists to quote their subjects correctly when they have the resources
to do so is neither oppressive nor analogous to self-censorship, espe-
cially in light of journalism's self-imposed canon of ethics.2 34 The dis-
sent contended that journalists are sufficiently protected from liability
for inadvertent or negligent misquotations by the requirement that the
public figure plaintiff prove actual malice.235 For example, if a jour-
nalist only takes notes and is unable to record every word, the jour-
nalist is protected from liability even though it may be negligent not
to use a tape recorder or to fail to double-check the source.236
The actual issue, according to the dissent, was whether journal-
ists must be free to alter quotations to perform their duties prop-
erly. 237 Thus, if "[a]n unqualified quotation attributed to a third party
is commonly understood to contain no interpretation [and] by using
quotation marks the writer warrants that she has interposed no edito-
rial comment, has resolved no ambiguities, [and] has added or
detracted nothing of substance, '238 then it follows that no alteration
was justified. Malcolm's alteration of Masson's quotations, whether
deliberate or not, amounted to an intentional lie or to a careless error,
neither of which materially advanced New York Times' interest in
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.239
Therefore, the fabricated quotations belonged to that class of state-
231. For a discussion of why quotations are potentially more devastating that mere
statements of fact, see supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
232. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1570 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, I I I S. Ct. 39 (1990); Taylor, supra note 5, at 8, col. 1.
233. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1548.
234. See supra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
235. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1549.
239. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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ments which "are no essential part of any expression of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality"' "2 and necessarily raised a jury issue as to actual
malice.
Proposing that a person's statement is fact, and that altering quo-
tations merits no more first amendment protection than any other fal-
sification, 241 the dissent presented an alternative standard, a "five-step
inquiry," to resolve the issue:242
1. Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition
of what the speaker said?
2. If so, is it inaccurate?
3. If so, is the inaccuracy material?
4. If so, is the inaccuracy defamatory?
5. If so, is the inaccuracy a result of malice, Le., is it a fabrication
or was it committed in reckless disregard of the truth?
243
Under this inquiry, if the answer to any of the questions is no, then as
a matter of law the defendant prevails. If the answer to all of the
question could be yes, then the matter is to be sent to the jury for
determination.244
The dissent's inquiry is troublesome because it omits an essential
question regarding the falsity issue. Under the dissent's inquiry, fal-
sity pertains only to whether the journalist knew that the subject's
actual statements differed from those attributed to him or that the
journalist acted in reckless disregard with respect thereto.245 Thus,
actual malice, with respect to quotations, is simply an issue of
whether the journalist deliberately or recklessly altered the quotation.
To reduce actual malice to this issue alone, however, creates an unde-
sirable chilling effect by holding journalists to verbatim quotations. If
quotations are considered to be statements of fact, then the common
law rules of defamation and the actual malice requirements of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth require addressing
additional issues. These issues include whether the altered quotation
240. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
241. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1562 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 1562-66.
243. Id.
244. Id. Two recent commentaries agree with the dissent's approach; neither, however,
contemplates the common law concept of substantial falsity and its relationship to an actual
malice standard as applied to altered quotations. See Case Comment, Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine: Actual Malice and Direct Quotations-The Constitutional Right to Lie, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 564 (1990); Comment, When Is a Quote Not a Quote?: The Subjectivity of
Truth in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 150 (1989).
245. See id. at 1562.
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was substantially false under the common law rules of defamation, 2"
whether the altered quotation would have a different and more dam-
aging effect on the mind of the reader than the speaker's actual
words, 247 and whether the journalist knew or acted in reckless disre-
gard of the different and more damaging effect. 248
The first question of the dissent's inquiry, "Does the quoted
material purport to be a verbatim repetition of what the speaker
said?," touches on the issue raised in Baker v. Los Angeles Herald
Examiner219 and in Selleck v. Globe International, Inc..250 In Baker,
the California Supreme Court held that a quotation was not a state-
ment of fact and therefore was not actionable because the critic, by
using the term "impression," had informed the reader that he was
only expressing an opinion.251 In Selleck, the California Court of
Appeals rejected the argument that certain quoted passages were
expressions of opinion and therefore did not give rise to a cause of
action, concluding that the article did "not merely express defendant's
opinion that plaintiff made statements about his son. Rather, [it]
assert[ed] as a fact that plaintiff made the statements. 252 Conse-
quently, the dissent's use of Baker and Selleck illustrates that a jour-
nalist can defeat the inference that the quoted material purports to be
exactly what the speaker said by emphasizing that the quotation is
merely an opinion or an interpretation of words actually spoken.
The second question, "[I]s [the quote] inaccurate?," requires a
direct comparison between what the speaker said and what the jour-
nalist quoted him as saying.253 Although this question appears
straightforward, difficulties do arise. As in Dunn v. Gannett New
York Newspapers, Inc.,254 where translations are involved, or in
instances where the speaker's statements are partially inaudible, it
becomes necessary for journalists to make judgments as to what the
speaker actually said. Where journalistic judgments are required, the
246. See supra notes 31-33 & 221 and accompanying text.
247. See Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 193 N.E. 537 (1934); M. ELDRIDGE, supra
note 34, at 337; supra notes 32 & 34 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring proof of actual
malice); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (same); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (1964) (same); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (same).
249. 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032
(1987); see supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
250. 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1985); see supra notes 144-47 and
accompanying text.
251. Baker, 42 Cal. 3d at 263, 721 P.2d at 92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
252. Selleck, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1133, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
253. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1564 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, I11 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
254. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987); see supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
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dissent suggests that the journalist's choice must be respected, absent
a showing of deliberate or reckless fabrication. 255
The next inquiry, "[I]s the inaccuracy material?," merely
acknowledges that journalists often correct quotations to avoid gram-
matical errors and improper word usage.25 6 Under the dissent's stan-
dard, such cosmetic changes would not be actionable because they are
not considered material. Conversely, rephrasing a speaker's state-
ment automatically represents a material change. Under the common
law rules of defamation, however, the question should be whether the
inaccuracy is substantially false. Implicit in the dissent's "material"
standard is an elevated standard of falsity. For example, if a speaker
says, "I killed him," and the journalist quotes the speaker as saying,
"I murdered him," the dissent's material inquiry might yield a differ-
ent result than the common law substantial falsity analysis. Under
the dissent's inquiry, the issue is only whether the alteration is mate-
rial, and a change in wording under the dissent's standard is material.
Under the common law rules of defamation, however, "[i]t is not
necessary to establish the literal truth of the precise statement made.
Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the
defamatory charge is true in substance. ' 257 Therefore, the substantial
falsity analysis must be content specific. For example, one can kill
accidentally whereas calling one a murderer connotes a premeditated
act of violence. Thus, if the speaker had accidentally killed the
deceased, then changing the word killer to murderer within the quota-
tion would not convey the substantial truth and would be actionable.
On the other hand, if the speaker deliberately murdered the deceased,
then changing the statement "I killed him" to "I murdered him"
would be substantially true and would not be actionable.
The fourth question, "[I]s the inaccuracy defamatory?,"
addresses the individual state's definition of libel. Under California
libel law, misquotations constitute libel if the misquote exposed the
subject to "hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him
in his occupation. ' 258  For example, in Bindrim v. Mitchell,259 mis-
255. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1564 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 1558 (quoting from THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL
184 (1982)).
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f (1977); see W. PROSSER & R.
KEETON, supra note 30, at 842 (stating that "it is not necessary to prove the literal truth of the
accusation in every detail"); see also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
258. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982); see also supra note 9 (California's definition of
libel).
259. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979); see
supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
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quotations "cast [the subject] in a disparaging light since they portray
his language and conduct as crude, aggressive, and unprofessional. ' ' 260
Thus, California courts recognize the actionability of mis-
quotations.261
The final question, "[I]s the inaccuracy a result of malice, i.e., is
it a fabrication or was it committed in reckless disregard of the
truth?," only explores whether the journalist knew that the subject's
actual statements differed from those attributed to him or whether the
journalist acted in reckless disregard with respect thereto.262 Under
the dissent's approach, Masson necessarily reached this final question:
the quoted material purported to be a verbatim repetition of what
Masson had said because Malcolm did not qualify the quotation as an
opinion; 263 the attributed quotations could be found to be inaccurate
because Masson alleged that they differed from his actual statements
and because there were no circumstances which required Malcolm to
use her judgment to determine what Masson actually said;261 the inac-
curacies were material because Malcolm did more than correct Mas-
son's language, she completely rephrased his statements; 265 and
arguably, the inaccuracies were defamatory.266 Therefore, the final
question asked only if Malcolm knew that Masson's actual statements
differed from those attributed to him or acted in reckless disregard
with respect thereto.
The dissent considered the contention that Malcolm fabricated
some of her notes because certain sentences of her typed drafts had
been crossed out and replaced with the disputed quotations.267 Fur-
thermore, the dissent considered the testimony that Malcolm had
repeatedly represented to her publisher that "everything was on tape"
and had told Masson not to worry about being misquoted because all
quotations would be verbatim.268 The dissent concluded:
Should the jury believe Masson, they could view this as a signifi-
cant indication of malice. First, they could consider it as proof
that Malcolm intended to deceive Masson about her intentions
260. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 77, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
261. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1565 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990); see also Baker v. Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 261, 721 P.2d 87, 91, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 210 (1986); Selleck v.
Globe Int'l, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 1123, 1132, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (Ct. App. 1985).
262. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1566.
263. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
"265. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1566; see supra notes 166-88 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 11.
268. See supra note 11.
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with respect to the quotes. Also, if Malcolm warranted to Masson
that she would take all quotes verbatim off the tapes, I should
think it would be at least reckless of her not to use the tapes to
verify the accuracy of the quotes she used.
The jury may, of course, disbelieve Masson's account of many
of these disputed facts. Or, it may decide that, under all the cir-
cumstances, Malcolm was merely careless, not deliberate or reck-
less. But a jury might well come to a more sinister conclusion. I
respectfully suggest that were a jury to do so on this record, we
would exceed our authority in saying that they were wrong.269
The dissent's standard equates misquotation to falsity without
examining the common law definition of truth. Under the common
law rules of defamation, the truth requirement does not require abso-
lute precision, 270 and if a statement is not substantially false, it is not
actionable. 271  Because "literal truth" 272 is not required, it follows
that the exact words are not as important as their meaning. Thus, in
the spirit of the common law rules of defamation, the dissent's final
question requires a two-part analysis addressing whether the substan-
tial falsity was a result of actual malice: first, asking whether the jour-
nalist knew or acted in reckless disregard that the quotation had been
altered; and second, asking whether the journalist knew or acted in
reckless disregard of the different and more damaging effect of the
altered quotation. The second part of this analysis would protect
journalists who alter quotations but still convey the same meaning as
the original statements and journalists who are negligent with respect
to the different and more damaging effect of altered quotations.
Otherwise, the dissent's final question would require journalists to
guarantee the literal truth of all quotations, a requirement that vio-
lates the spirit of New York Times.273
B. An Alternative Inquiry
For the dissent's approach to conform both to common law rules
of defamation and to the actual malice standard, the "five-step
inquiry" must be revised as follows:
1. Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition
of what the speaker said?
2. If so, is it inaccurate?
3. If so, is the inaccuracy substantially false?
269. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1567-68 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
270. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
4. If so, is the substantial falsity defamatory?
5. If so, is the substantial falsity a result of actual malice, i.e., did
the journalist know or act with reckless disregard of whether the
quotation had been altered, and also did the journalist know or act
with reckless disregard of the different and more damaging effect of
the altered quotation?
In response to the first two questions of the revised inquiry and
as the dissent asserted,274 the quoted material purported to be a verba-
tim repetition of Masson's statements and was inaccurate. In reply to
the third question regarding substantial falsity, arguably a jury could
find that there was substantial falsity based on the considerable dis-
parity in meaning between the original and the published state-
ments.2 7 5 Substantial falsity alone, however, is not enough to prove
actual malice.276 Because a jury could find that the altered quotations
were sufficiently defamatory to satisfy the fourth question,277 the addi-
tional determination necessary in this instance would be in response
to the final question of whether a jury could find that the substantial
falsity was a result of actual malice, i.e., did the journalist know or act
with reckless disregard of whether the quotation had been altered,
and also did the journalist know or act with reckless disregard of the
different and more damaging effect of the altered quotation?
As the dissent contended, Malcolm fabricated some of her notes
because certain sentences of her typed drafts had been crossed out and
replaced with the disputed quotations. 271 Furthermore, the dissent
considered the testimony that Malcolm had repeatedly represented to
her publisher that "everything was on tape" and had told Masson not
to worry about being misquoted because all quotations would be ver-
batim.279 If a jury could find that Malcolm altered the quotations, as
the typed drafts indicated, and that she knew of the potentially differ-
ent and more damaging effect of the alterations on the reader, as she
indicated in employing the phrase "intellectual gigolo,"28 0 then there
exists a jury issue as to actual malice, making summary judgment
improper.
274. See supra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 166-88 and accompanying text. Consequently, a jury issue would exist
regarding whether the altered quotations were substantially true in meaning when compared to
Masson's actual statements on tape.
276. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984).
277. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 11.
279. See supra note 11.
280. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The majority and dissent differ both in framing and in resolving
the issues in Masson. The majority's rational interpretation standard
extends beyond the New York Times actual malice standard 281 allows
journalists to quote a public figure based upon the journalist's rational
interpretation of the public figure's actual statement. If, under the
guise of literary license, journalists are allowed to invent quotations
based on interpretations of ambiguities.or content without remaining
faithful to the meaning of verbatim statements, there are few words
that a journalist cannot put into a subject's mouth.2"2 Granting such
discretion to journalists by shielding fabricated quotations is a danger-
ous and unwarranted extension of first amendment protection.
The dissent's five-step inquiry is insufficient under both the com-
mon law rules of defamation and the actual malice standard. The
dissent's resolution of the issue is deficient because it equates falsity
with whether the journalist knew or acted in reckless disregard of the
fact that the subject's actual statements differ from those attributed to
him.28 3 Thus, actual malice, with respect to quotations, is simply an
inquiry into whether the journalist deliberately or recklessly altered
the quotation. To reduce actual malice to this inquiry alone creates
an undesirable chilling effect by holding journalists to verbatim
quotations.
If quotations are considered to be statements of fact, then knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth must also address
additional issues. These issues include whether the altered quotation
was substantially false under common law rules of defamation,284
whether the altered quotation would have a different and more dam-
aging effect on the mind of the reader than the speaker's literal quota-
tion,2 83 and whether the journalist knew or acted in reckless disregard
of the different and more damaging effect.286 Only then will the
examination of altered quotations coincide with the common law con-
281. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
282. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1553 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
283. Id. at 1566.
284. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977). This section states: "One
who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the
statement is true." Id.; see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 34.
286. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring proof of actual
malice); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (same); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (1964) (same); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (same).
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cept of substantial falsity and with the impetus behind the New York
Times actual malice standard.
JONATHAN I. LESSNER
